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Introduction
As of 2012, U.S. and foreign corporations have invested an estimated
fourteen billion dollars of private capital in farmland and agricultural
infrastructure.1  These investments reflect a trend of increasing land deals
worldwide that covers an area of nearly 1,148 million acres.2  Of this land,
approximately two-thirds were acquired in Africa.3  Africa therefore
appears to be at the center of this wave of investment.4  In West Africa
alone, there have been about 115 large-scale land deals in agriculture, with
the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia as some of the largest primary
and secondary investors.5
Social scientists attribute these large investments to impending food
security concerns; countries will soon require an increase in agricultural
output to meet the predicted demand.6  Others state more generally that
Africa is attractive to investors because of the perceived abundance of avail-
able land and resources, as well as favorable fiscal and tax incentives.7
Based on the volume of these investments, scholars have likened the phe-
nomenon to a gold rush where investors— led by states, agribusinesses, and
private equity funds— move feverishly in pursuit of resources.8
The level of investment over the past ten years has been so potent that
countries such as Sierra Leone and South Sudan have sold about 32% and
1. Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food, 49
STAN. J. INT’L L. 101, 111 (Winter 2013) (citing Farms and Funds: Investment Funds in the
Global Land Rush, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV.  1 (Jan. 2012), available at http://pubs
.iied.org/pdfs/17121IIED.pdf); Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Deci-
phering Emergent’s Investments in Africa, OAKLAND INST. (June 2011), available at http://
media.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_EAM_Brief_1.pdf
(describing case study of agricultural investment in Africa).
2. Analysis: Land Grab or Development Opportunity, BBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17099348 [hereinafter Opportunity].
3. Id.
4. Pan African Parliament, Making Investment Work for Africa: A parliamentarian
response to “land grabs”, at 2 (July 22, 2011) [hereinafter Making Investment Work].
5. Western Africa, LANDMATRIX, http://www.landmatrix.org/get-the-detail/by-tar
get-region/western-africa/?order_by= [hereinafter LANDMATRIX].
6. Mark Bowman, Land Rights, Not Land Grabs, Can Help Africa Feed Itself, CNN
NEWS (June 18, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/18/opinion/land-grabs-africa-
mark-bowman/index.html (“[W]ith the global food supply needing to increase by an
estimated 70% by 2050, [Africa] is at the heart of the challenge at food security”).
7. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 2. R
8. Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the Rights
of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 504 (2011).
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10% of their landmass, respectively.9  Large-scale land acquisitions, how-
ever, are not inherently detrimental.  In theory, these investments could
mutually benefit foreign investors and local populations.  Investors gain
access and rights to the land and its resources, which could improve their
enterprises, while local populations potentially receive more jobs, export
earnings, and advanced technologies.10  At the state level, large-scale
investment could also satisfy countries’ needs to improve productivity and
market access.11  As the Comprehensive Agriculture Development Program
(CAADP) illustrates, Africa needs 250 billion dollars of investment to
develop infrastructure in rural areas between 2002 and 2015.12  Thus, the
African continent has a strong interest in allowing large-scale land
investments.
In reality, these development opportunities are not realized and invest-
ment rarely results in win-win situations.  Studies reveal that with the
promise of agricultural value, these land deals actually result in devastating
consequences for local communities.  Notably, these export-driven land
deals do not account for local interests13 and evict local farmers from land
they have long regarded as their own.14  This result is particularly striking
when considering deals that involve investors from the financial sector.  In
these cases, less than 12% of the acquired land is put under production,
suggesting that the land only supports highly speculative ventures.15
Therefore, the local population does not even get to experience the poten-
tial upside of investment— development.  For these reasons, critics of the
large-scale land acquisitions more accurately describe the phenomenon as
“land grabbing.”16
Reporters Harry Verhoeven and Eckart Woertz assert, however, that
Africa’s land grab is a myth— nothing more than a “mirage in the desert.”17
They argue that despite years of heated debate, scholars know very little
about what occurs on the ground.18  In the case of Sudan, for example,
confidential Ministry of Investment statistics revealed that only about 20%
of agricultural partnerships saw some degree of implementation, sug-
9. LANDMATRIX, supra note 5. R
10. Opportunity, supra note 2. R
11. Id.
12. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 2. R
13. Opportunity, supra note 2 (referring to International Labor Commission reports R
saying that the jobs created are few, short-lived, and low paid, and that the public reve-
nues are limited by tax exemptions).
14. See Bowman, supra note 6; see also Opportunity, supra note 2 (discussing ILC R
study finding that in Uganda, 200,000 people claimed to be evicted from their land as a
result of large land deals).
15. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 3 (referring to the Oxfam case study of R
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali and Tanzania).
16. Harry Verhoeven & Eckert Woertz, Op-Ed., Mirage in the Desert: The Myth of
Africa’s Land Grab, CNN (July 9, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/05/business/
op-ed-africa-land-grab/index.html [hereinafter Mirage].
17. Id.
18. Id.
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gesting that the established view of land grabs was distorted.19  Prevailing
scholarship and current statistics, however, reveal that land grabs and their
effects are real.20  Verhoeven and Woertz’s argument nevertheless high-
lights the level of uncertainty and vagueness underlying land grabs.  Schol-
ars concede that land grabs often result from secret deals where the details
of the agreements are not disclosed to the public.21  Further, scholars also
find that land grabs seem to eschew democratic planning and evade local
participation that would otherwise create a system of rights and responsi-
bilities for enabling the people to voice their consent to sell the land.  The
question remaining is how these large-scale land acquisitions are possible.
Perhaps Verhoeven and Woertz’s mirage is not in the effects of land grabs,
but is instead in the legal framework under which land grabbing occurs.
The Note undertakes this review by examining the sources of law at
the national and international level that govern the way in which large-
scale land transactions occur in Africa.  Part I begins by briefly introducing
the bifurcated legal system in Africa, where African customary law22 and
common law govern the people’s rights and responsibilities.23  Section A
defines customary law from a historical perspective.  As this system is a
relic of the post-independence governments,24 the hierarchical relationship
of authority corresponds with the subject of dispute and ethnic back-
ground of the parties.25  Section B describes the investors in large land
transactions and how they may complicate land deals.  Part II then ana-
lyzes the land rights that the systems afford.  Part III describes the structure
of land deals and examines how land rights operate when foreign investors
seek to purchase large tracts of land.  Recognizing the negative ramifica-
tions of land grabs on local communities, Part IV then contends that Afri-
can customary law, when supported by international law, can adapt to
afford real property rights rather than a mirage.
19. Id. (basing findings on confidential statistics from Sudan’s Ministry of
Investment).
20. See SANDRA F. JOIREMAN, WHERE THERE IS NO GOVERNMENT: ENFORCING PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN COMMON LAW AFRICA (2011); Chris DeLaubenfels, Book Note, 45 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 362 (2012) (reviewing SANDRA F. JOIREMAN, WHERE THERE IS NO GOVERN-
MENT: ENFORCING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COMMON LAW AFRICA (2011)); Narula, supra note 1.
21. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 4. R
22. Technically a single “African customary law” does not exist.  The customary law,
sometimes noted as “traditional law” differs by tribe and ethnic group, although certain
characteristics underlie all of the customary law systems in Africa. See a full discussion
of the topic in Part I of this Note. Here, I employ the term “African customary law” to
avoid confusion in Part VI where the Note discusses the distinct customary international
law.
23. See ANTHONY ALLOTT, The Reception of Extraneous Law, in NEW ESSAYS IN AFRICAN
LAW, 21– 27 (1970).
24. Id.
25. See JOIREMAN, supra note 20, at 9 (attributing Africa’s poorly defined property R
rights to the colonial era where the indigenous people were thought to hold land in
common); William Twining, Lecture at the University of Chicago: The Place of Custom-
ary Law in The National Legal System of East Africa (Jan. 1, 1964) (describing the rela-
tionship between customary law and the common law).
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I. Background: Bifurcated Legal System in Africa & the Investor
Problem
To better understand the legal context of land grabbing, it is helpful to
illustrate (1) the complexity of the domestic legal systems in Africa, and (2)
the complications that investors pose on this framework.  Scholars charac-
terize Africa’s legal environment with the term “legal pluralism,” where
multiple systems of law coexist in a single jurisdiction.26  More broadly,
practitioners understand legal pluralism as the “state of affairs in which a
category of social relations is within fields of operation of two or more
bodies of legal norms.”27  In Africa, the relevant legal norms are the com-
mon law and African customary law systems.28
A. Defining African Customary Law
At the time of independence, state constitutions in Africa defined cus-
tomary law as understood during the colonial era.  As a result, scholars
find complementary definitions of customary law among various states
with similar colonial legacies.  For example, Ghana interprets customary
law as “comprising of rules of law which by custom are applicable to par-
ticular communities . . . not being rules of common law under any enact-
ment providing for the assimilation of such rules of customary law, as are
suitable for general application.”29  In Sierra Leone, the constitution
defines “customary law” as “any rule, other than a rule of general law, hav-
ing the force of law in any chiefdom of the provinces whereby rights and
correlative duties have been imposed . . . .”30  Nigeria similarly sees cus-
tomary law as “local custom that includes a rule, which in a particular
district or among members of a tribe or clan . . . has from long usage,
obtained the force of law.”31  African governments thus see customary law
as a separate body of law that contrasts the common law, or state-made
law, while simultaneously, relegating customary law to a position of
authority similar to local custom.
In practice, there is no single “African customary law.”  Customary
law varies by country and by ethnic group.  In Nigeria alone, there are 350
ethnic groups, each with its own system of customary law.32  Nevertheless,
there are certain characteristics of customary law that are consistent across
ethnic groups.  Primarily, customary law operates on a personal level, inva-
26. Olu Agbede, Legal Pluralism, in FUNDAMENTALS OF NIGERIAN LAW, 235– 48, at 235
(Ayo Ajomo ed., 1989) [hereinafter Legal Pluralism].
27. Gordon R. Woodman, Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice, 40 J. AFR. L. 152,
157 (1966).
28. Legal Pluralism, supra note 26. R
29. ANTHONY ALLOTT, The Definition of Customary Law and Repugnancy of Customary
Law, in NEW ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW app. C at 161 (1970) [hereinafter The Definition of
Customary Law] (referring to Ghana’s /interpretation Act (C.A.4), s. 18(1)).
30. Id. (referring to Sierra Leone’s Local Courts Act 1963 (No. 20 of 1963), s. 2).
31. Id.
32. Legal Pluralism, supra note 26, at 235 (citing OBAFEMI AWOLOWO, THOUGHTS ON R
NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION 24 (1966)).
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riably tying a person to the customary law of his ancestors.33  Adherents
further describe customary law as living law that adapts over time to the
needs of the community.34  Accordingly, this Note will refer to African cus-
tomary law as the personal law relating to members living under the tradi-
tional African legal system.
B. African Customary Law in the Common Law Context
Once incorporated into the formal legal system during colonialism,
African customary law was forced to comply with the requirements of the
dominant legal culture.35  This hierarchical view of the common law and
African customary law has formed through the colonial regime.  During
the nineteenth century, for instance, colonial courts limited the recognition
of African customary law under the “repugnancy proviso,” also known as
the “repugnancy clause.”36  The repugnancy clause prevented African cus-
tomary law from applying in so far as it “oppose[d] the principles of public
policy and natural justice.”37  Courts understood these principles to char-
acterize Western European ideas of moral propriety.38  Consequently, the
common law and Western ideals functioned as a “check” on the authority
of African customary law.  This meant, for example, that even in customary
law marriage, which was wholly governed by African customary law, the
bride’s uncles negotiated the marriage arrangement on her behalf,39 and
the bride had to consent.40  Similarly, custody awards determined under
African customary law had to be decided on the basis of the child’s best
interests regardless of payment or bride wealth.41  In both circumstances,
African customary law had to adapt to fit within the dominant legal
framework.
Later in the twentieth century, courts declined to invoke the repug-
nancy clause because of two emerging schools of thought: functionalist
anthropology and legal positivism.42  Functionalist anthropology com-
pelled scholars and lawmakers to regard customary law on its own stan-
dards rather than in European terms.43  Legal positivism then “de-
contextualized law by abstracting it from its social and moral or ethical
background.”44  Despite these movements, modern courts will not apply
33. Id. at 237.
34. T.W. Bennet, The Compatibility of African Customary Law and Human Rights,
1991 ACTA JURIDICA 18, 20 (1991).
35. Id. at 18– 35. Although this work pertains to the South African legal system, the
analysis of African customary law is widely applicable to other African countries with
bifurcated legal systems.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Legal Pluralism, supra note 26. R
40. Bennet, supra note 34, at 24.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 24– 25.
43. Id. at 24; KAPLAN & MANNERS, CULTURE THEORY 55ff (1972).
44. Bennet, supra note 34, at 25 (citing R.B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOP- R
MENT 31-34 (1978)).
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African customary law if the customary law fails to satisfy modified con-
ceptions of the repugnancy and incompatibility tests.45  As such, custom-
ary law is “[still] only applicable as long as it is not repugnant to justice
and morality.”46
The sustained hierarchical relationship between common law and
African customary law is most evident when we look to African states’ con-
stitutions.  One prime example is the Kenyan constitution’s supremacy
clause and section on judicial authority.  Under the supremacy clause Arti-
cle 2(4), the constitution states that “any law, including customary law that
is inconsistent with the constitution is void to the extent of the inconsis-
tency . . . .”47  The constitution is thus clearly placed on a higher level than
African customary law.  The constitution further explains common law’s
supremacy in Article 159 on judicial authority.  There, Clause 3 states that
traditional dispute resolution, recognized in African customary law, “shall
not be used in a way that . . . is repugnant to justice and morality or results
in outcomes that are repugnant to justice or morality; or is inconsistent
with this constitution or any written law.”48  Clause 3 seemingly indicates
that African customary law is lower than not only the constitution, but also
lower than any codified law.  From the language “repugnant to justice or
morality,” it is clear that vestiges of the colonial conception of customary
law persist in the modern legal system.
Similar distinctions exist in the African court systems.  In Nigeria, for
example, the judiciary established separate courts to administer the differ-
ent laws.49  The resultant problem is that there is a divergence in the qual-
ity of justice, given the different procedural rules and the fact that the racial
origin of the litigant determines the court system that the litigant can use.50
C. Land Grabs Reveal Endemic Problem of the Bifurcated Legal System
The arguably larger problem with the bifurcated legal system involves
choosing which law to use.  In most cases, the applicable legal system is not
prescribed.51  Relevant considerations thus reflect choice of law princi-
ples.52  The general rule is that parties “may select the law to be applied to
their relationship, provided that the decision does not prejudice a third
party’s rights.”53  Apart from this general rule, courts look to objective ele-
ments that include (1) the nature and form or a prior transaction; (2) the
subject matter and environment of a transaction; and (3) the litigant’s cul-
tural orientation.54  For land tenure that involves members of a tribe or
45. The Definition of Customary Law, supra note 29, at 162.
46. Id.
47. CONSTITUTION, art. 2(4) (2010) (Kenya).
48. Id. art. 159 (3)(b)-(c).
49. Legal Pluralism, supra note 26, at 236. R
50. Id. at 238.
51. Chuma Himoga, The Application of African Customary Law under the Constitution
of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just the Beginning?, 117 S. AFR. L. J 306, 314 (2000).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 314– 15.
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chiefdom transferring rural land, African customary law typically applies.
The local sellers’ “cultural orientation”— the rural environment and tradi-
tional society that they belong to— helps establish African customary law
as controlling in this characteristically informal and small-scale tenure.  If
both parties (seller and buyer) live under the same traditional system, the
choice of law is even clearer.  Large-scale land acquisitions, however, oper-
ate differently.  As the actors involved in these large-scale transactions dif-
fer from those in traditional tenure, land grabs present a different scenario
for the law to operate.
D. Understanding the Participants in the African Land Grab
Researchers observe that three types of investors participate in the
African land market.  The first group encompasses cash-rich but food-inse-
cure states, particularly from the Gulf Region and Asia.55  This group of
actors operates through sovereign wealth funds and state trading enter-
prises.56  The second group includes Western “agribusinesses”57 that aim
to expand market opportunities.58  The third and newest group to the Afri-
can land market comes from the financial sector.59  Here, banks, private
equity funds, pension funds, and hedge funds acquire land for speculative
ventures.60  Private equity funds include institutional investors and
wealthy individuals.61  Many of these private equity funds investing in
farmland, however, are not listed on a stock exchange62 and very little of
their information is publicly available.63  By contrast, pension funds are
highly regulated investors that essentially manage the public’s money.64
Hedge funds, like mutual funds, pool and professionally manage invest-
ments.65  Hedge funds are, however, “more flexible in their investment
strategies and generally adopt a more aggressive approach with high levels
of speculation.”66  This third group of financial sector investors, as the
Note will reveal, is the most problematic.
Part of the legal quandary stems from the investors’ aims.  Investors
are primarily interested in balancing risks and returns.67  For this reason,
investors see farmland as an opportunity for potentially high, long-term
returns and as a way of diversifying risk away from traditional assets such
55. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 3. R
56. Id.
57. Id. (defining agribusinesses as enterprises that specialize in food production,
processing, and exporting).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Farms and Funds: Investment Funds in the Global Land Rush, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T
& DEV. 2 (Jan. 2012), available at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17121IIED.pdf [hereinafter
IIED].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. IIED, supra note 61, at 1; OAKLAND INST., supra note 1. R
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as equity and bonds.”68  Specifically, investors like agribusinesses expect
high returns from rising farmland values and increased agricultural pro-
ductivity on acquired lands.69  Some investors also pursue large-scale land
acquisitions with high yield potential and invest further in agricultural pro-
ductivity,70 with the goal of increasing their annual returns.71  As the value
of the returns fluctuates with the price of agricultural commodities in
export and domestic markets, investors can protect themselves from short-
term swings by leasing out land and transferring risk to the farm opera-
tors.72  Generally, the investors are more interested in the long-term effects
on commodity prices.73  Consequently, their investment strategy allows
them to realize growing returns from agriculture.74  These long-term, large-
scale economic goals require neither day-to-day control over the land, nor
personal relationships with those on neighboring tracts.  In that sense, the
fundamentally detached and formal nature of large-scale land transactions
differs from the small-scale, informal, and personal transactions that oper-
ate under African customary law.  The emerging legal issue with land grab-
bing is that sellers transfer large tracts of rural land by using customary
law in commercial transactions that by nature and subject matter are his-
torically governed by the common law.
II. Contrasting Land Rights Under African Customary Law and
Common Law
In Africa, land tenure regimes, like legal norms, can vary within a sin-
gle country.75  In some cases, the “traditional” or “communal” land tenure
system exists side by side with “modern” individualized tenure.76  Com-
mon law, which recognizes private ownership, governs the transfer of land
in the export sector.  Thus, in a valid export-oriented land transaction, the
title and use of land goes from the private owner to the buyer, as stipulated
in the contract.  By contrast, African customary law establishes communal
property rights for rural land, where the chief has the power to allocate
land on behalf of the community.
The division between these legal norms and land tenure regimes
became less distinct with the individualization of property rights in Africa
over the course of the twentieth century.77  This development effectively
gave greater rights to the individual cultivating household, reducing the
68. IIED, supra note 61, at 1. R
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. IIED, supra note 61, at 1. R
75. Catherine Boone, Property and Constitutional Order: Land Tenure Reform and the
Future of the African State, 10 AFR.AFFAIRS 557, 565 (2007).
76. Sam Rugege, Chiefs Commoners and The Land: Struggles over Control and Access
to Land in Colonial Lesotho, 8 LESOTHO L.J. 1, 34 (1992).
77. Ryan Bubb, The Evolution of Property Rights: State Law or Informal Norms?, 56 J.
L. & ECON. 555, 559 (2013).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN307.txt unknown Seq: 10 12-JAN-15 10:48
718 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
authority of extended family groups and chiefs.78  Currently, rural land in
Sub-Saharan Africa generally falls within two types: the communal regime
and the user rights regime.79  In the communal regime, traditional authori-
ties continue to exercise political influence and play an important role in
resource allocation.80  Under the user rights regime, state agents instead
play an ongoing role in local resource allocation,81 thus altering the charac-
ter of customary land rights to reflect the private ownership aim of the
common law.
A. Traditional Land Ownership in Customary Law Lands
1. General Rights
Generally, “traditional” or “communal” land tenure is the system in
which the land belongs to the whole community and is not owned by indi-
viduals with the right of disposal.82  Here, individuals “only have rights of
access for use,” whether for residential, agricultural, or other purposes.83
This land does not include communal production and consumption.84
The traditional land tenure system is thus communal in the sense that an
individual accepts that, as a member of a particular community, he or she
has an inherent right to allotted land for residence and subsistence cultiva-
tion.85  Accordingly, membership in local community, village, clan, or kin-
ship group confers land-use rights.86  Such membership rights also include
the community’s right to keep its land from being sold and removed from
the community through a headman once the holder ceases to be a member
of the community.87  Further, all members have equal access to undivided
grazing land of the village or ward.88  Thus, under the traditional system—
when completely set apart from the common law’s individualized system—
all land is either unclaimed no-man’s land or is under the exclusive domin-
ion of a particular clan.89  In the communal regime, state action upholds
and ratifies these arrangements, enabling non-elected, non-state local level
actors like chiefs to exercise traditional land management powers.90
2. The Power to Distribute Land
Traditionally, a chief’s power correlates with his “control over access to
78. Id.
79. Boone, supra note 75, at 565. R
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Rugege, supra note 76, at 34. R
83. Id.
84. Id. at 35.
85. Id.
86. Boone, supra note 75, at 563. R
87. Id.
88. Rugege, supra note 76, at 35 (citing C.K. MEEK, LAND LAW AND CUSTOM IN THE R
COLONIES 18– 19, London: OUP (1946)).
89. Id. (citing Philip Meyer & Iona Meyer, Land Law in the Making, in AFRICAN LAW:
ADAPTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 59 (Hilda Kruper & Leo Kuper eds., 1965)).
90. Boone, supra note 75, at 563. R
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agricultural and residential land by people under [his] jurisdiction.”91
Thus, in a communal regime, the chief’s role as custodian of the land often
includes settling disputes between lineages, reallocating land among lin-
eages, and superintending transfers to land within the community.92
Scholars emphasize the importance of the chief’s duty to allocate land.93
In fact, a statute in Letheroll specifically stated, “All chiefs and headmen
must by law provide people living under them with lands to cultivate.”94
The authority to distribute land is particularly important to land
grabs.  Under the African customary law arrangement, the chief in the area
must sanction the transfer of the right to use land.  The ideology is that the
land belongs to the community as a whole, and the king only administers
the land on the behalf of the community to control scarce resources.95
Even in the pre-colonial period of customary law, land was not alienable by
its holders, whether for consideration or gratis.96  The community as such
has no real control over the distribution of land.97  In that regard, chiefs
have the sole authority to redistribute and allocate land in their role of
determining who is part of the community.
3. When the Power to Distribute Creates the Power to Revoke and
Transact Land
As custodian of the land, the chief can revoke land from individuals
for either one of two reasons: inspection or neglect.98  Under the chief’s
power of inspection, the chief can take arable land away from the head of
household if the chief is satisfied that the household has more than it
needs for subsistence.99  Practitioners justify inspection on the grounds
that the land is allocated according to need.  If the circumstances change,
then revocation makes egalitarian sense in terms of equity vis-a-vis the
entire community.100  Nevertheless, the chief has discretion in deciding
whether to reallocate the land.
A chief can also take arable land away from a subject due to neglect or
non-utilization.101 The original idea was to prevent people who migrated
away from the area from claiming fields back on their return.102  The
chief’s power in this instance is unchecked, resulting in a unilateral deci-
sion to divest land.  In that way, the chief’s discretion under African cus-
tomary law can become a pretext for land transactions that exclude the
local people’s input.
91. Rugege, supra note 76, at 33. R
92. Bubb, supra note 77, at 559. R
93. Rugege, supra note 76, at 39. R
94. Id. (citing Laws of Lerotholl 1992. Law No. 8).
95. Id. at 37.
96. Id. at 36.
97. Rugege, supra note 76, at 39. R
98. Id. at 40.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 41.
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4. Scope of Customary Law Title is Too Narrow to Counteract Chief
Decision-Making
In the communal land tenure system, title includes everything above
and below the ground.  Title therefore encompasses not only the acreage of
land, but also the crops and minerals.  Here, the king or chief has para-
mount title.103  For the Akan in Ghana, whose spiritual belief considers the
ancestral stool the head of the community, the stool has paramount title.
The chief therefore holds the title in trust for the community.  Similarly,
when examining Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia) an anthropolo-
gist observed that “all land and its products belonged to the nation through
the king.”104  This common title of the nation to all the land translates to
individual access to plots of land allotted by the king through his village
headmen to heads of households for use.105
This is particularly problematic in circumstances where land investors
choose to transact directly with chiefs.  Even if locals oppose the chief’s
power to allocate and revoke land under the African customary law system,
the individual’s lack of title to the land renders him unable to adequately
affect the transaction.
B. Identifying the Problem: Weak Customary Land Rights For
Individuals Yield Vulnerable Sellers in Land Grabs
On crucial issues regarding who owns land under customary law and
whether land can be sold, there is considerable agreement.  As the previous
subsection illustrates, chiefs have the paramount title while individuals in
their communities have usufruct rights.  The broader problem for individu-
als is that the use rights are not codified, but only locally understood.
Consequently, foreign investors are more likely to transact under the guises
of the user rights regime.
1. User Rights Regime Dilutes Customary Rights
Under the user rights regime, governments challenge pre-existing
rights, land management processes, and land-allocation authorities by
standing behind land claims of “whoever uses the land.”106  The conflict
with African customary land rights occurs in situations where the user
rights rule enforces the land rights of individuals who are unrecognized
members of the local community.  These individuals include immigrants or
migrants (“strangers”) who have created plots outside their home locales
but within another locale that observes African customary law’s communal
regime.  As explained above, the chief has the ability to determine commu-
nity membership through land allocation.  Under the communal regime,
strangers who migrate outside of their home communities typically have to
103. Bubb, supra note 77, at 558– 59. R
104. Rugege, supra note 76, at 35 (citing M. GLUCKMAN, POLITICS, LAW, AND RITUAL IN R
TRIBAL SOCIETY (1965)).
105. Id.
106. Boone, supra note 75, at 564 (discussing farming context, but applying the state- R
ment more generally to use rights).
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bargain with the chief of their host community and pay some form of regu-
lar tribute in exchange for the right to use land.107  In those circumstances,
the community retains a reversionary interest in the land.108  When inves-
tors instead impose a user-rights regime on individual land users, they cir-
cumvent the chief’s power, removing the equitable exchange for rights that
would occur under African customary law’s communal regime.  In the
interim, this legal conflict creates a seemingly irreconcilable apparent ver-
sus actual authority issue.  The ultimate result is that individuals that
transact directly with investors for land are stuck between legal systems,
where their rights and those of the community are uncertain.
As these individuals are typically farmers with low levels of education,
they are typically less equipped to defend their interests.  Consequently,
parties permit deals that evict local farmers from land that they regarded
as their own.109  Therefore, it is not surprising that less than 12% of the
land acquired through these transactions is put under production, sug-
gesting that the land only supports highly speculative ventures.110  This is
the legal framework through which land grabbing occurs.
III. Mechanics of a Deal: African Customary Law and Common Law
in Action
Even in Mozambique, which is seen as having one of the best land
reform systems in Africa due to the country’s provision of legal title to com-
munities, the government still allocates land under legal community title to
foreign investors.111  This suggests that the African customary law land
rights have little weight in large-scale land acquisitions.  Part III of this Note
will deconstruct the land deal process in Africa to reveal (1) why parties do
not recognize African customary land rights and (2) how decision-makers
can improve the process.
A. Land Deals From the Investor Perspective
Land deals begin with investor action, where investors typically inter-
act with one another.  In theory, each investment undergoes the same inter-
nal process: due diligence; screening against the fund’s investment
strategy; board approval; establishment of legal structures to provide inves-
tors with various forms of ownership; and management to facilitate risk as
well as investment entrance and exit.112  The only large difference occurs
with public investors, such as sovereign wealth funds.  Public investors
begin investment by paying a management fee to an asset management
company.113  Then, as with other modes of investment, fund managers
107. Bubb, supra note 77, at 559. R
108. Id.
109. Bowman, supra note 6; see also Opportunity, supra note 2. R
110. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 3. (referring to Oxfam case study of R
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali and Tanzania).
111. Making Investment Work, supra note 4. R
112. IIED, supra note 61, at 3. R
113. Id.
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seek investment funds that go through the process of due diligence, screen-
ing, and board level approval.114  At that time, capital is put in the farm-
land of these large-scale land acquisitions.115  Through this process
investors expect a return on their investment to funnel back through the
channels of investment.116
Observers typically begin to see inequitable results once investors
interact with the state in which the land is located.  One can attribute this
result in part to investors’ expectations over the course of a land deal.
Investors regard the domestic laws and regulations of the host country as
the primary source of law.  In the typical transaction, the host government
enters into a contract where it defines the price, quantity, and duration for
the purchase or lease of the land.117  Here, the host government uses a
framework agreement to commit itself to making the land available to the
investor.118  The later process involves more specific instruments (prima-
rily contractual) that actually transfer all or part of the land.119  As part of
the agreement, the seller provides a range of rights and remedies for the
investor in addition to the contract mentioned above.  Yet, the degree to
which these deals are negotiated or standardized varies across countries
and across the different stages of the negotiation, where instruments that
allocate land tend to be more standardized.120  The parties then layer the
contracts over the domestic law.
From the host country’s perspective, the preparation and negotiation
processes for large-scale land deals often involve multiple government agen-
cies.121  Even in states that offer a central point of contact within the gov-
ernment for prospective investors, this contact will not address all aspects
of the land deal.122  At minimum, the contact engages with authorities
(typically government agencies) at the local level.  In Tanzania, for exam-
ple, this requires several governmental agencies to coordinate: the Tanzania
Investment Center must formally approve the investment for financial via-
bility; the Ministry of Agriculture must assess the agricultural viability of
the land; and the Ministry of Lands and Housing Development must look
at the land registration.  In practice, this communication is poor and
undermined in part by the agencies’ preference to only report positive
outcomes.123
The final contracts between the host governments and incoming inves-
tors are not public.124  This privacy exacerbates potential inequalities.  On
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 7. R
118. See Lorenzo Cotula et. al., Land Grab or Development Opportunity? Agricultural
Investments and International Land Deals in Africa, 2009 INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T AND DEV.
65, available at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12561IIED.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 65– 66.
121. Id. at 66.
122. Cotula, supra note 118, at 66. R
123. Id.
124. Id. at 68.
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the investor’s end, as described above, each investment also undergoes an
internal process of  due diligence; screening against the fund’s investment
strategy; board approval; establishment of legal structures to provide inves-
tors with various forms of ownership; and management to facilitate risk, as
well as investment entrance and exit.125  Yet, as most fund managers and
institutional investors manage other people’s money, they have a “fiduciary
duty to ensure that they invest with appropriate advice to maximize returns
commensurate with an acceptable level of risk.”126  This assessment, how-
ever, is economically focused and pressures investors to maximize profit
absent other considerations127 that could better account for customary
land rights.
B. Finding a Place for Customary Land Rights
Theoretically, the local populations’ land rights could enter the state
level of the land deal.  In practice, however, the rights do not apply.  The
question is why.  One reason could be that the party seeking the land is
not always the state.  Instead, there are investors that may either work with
the state and bypass the local population or transact directly with individu-
als who have little bargaining power.  Further, there is little recourse at the
state level for deals that take advantage of the weak African customary land
rights.  For example, investors can negotiate directly with landowners, who
are typically farmers with low levels of education and less equipped to
defend their interests.  Yet, these negotiations appear acceptable because
deals continue to take place behind closed doors, and the details of the
agreements are not made public.  Given the diminishing authority of Afri-
can customary law and increasing desire for foreign companies and gov-
ernments to invest in large “unoccupied” land, African customary law
seems to provide a false sense of rights to those living on customary lands.
Consequently, customary land occupies a gap in the legal system that
investors and beneficiaries can exploit.
The result is a process that lacks the local population’s consent and
participation.  African customary law, however, deals with the collective.
Thus, granting individual title is not likely to solve the problem.  For the
legal framework to protect customary land rights, it must account for this
aspect of group use and communal rights while providing the consent
missing from the land deal process.
IV. The Potential for International Law to Reinforce Customary Land
Rights
As African customary law is living law, in theory, it can adapt to miti-
gate the effects of land grabs.  The question is how.  Part IV of the Note
argues that local authorities can look to the international legal system.
125. IIED, supra note 61, at 3. R
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Gathering inspiration from international law is easiest for monist
states.  Under the monist theory of international law, domestic law is
subordinate to international law.128  As a consequence of this unified legal
system, domestic courts may look to sources of international law— such as
treaties and international customs— when determining cases that implicate
international concerns.129  Even if state authorities were to subscribe to
the dualist theory, where international law and domestic law occupy differ-
ent legal spheres, international law could at least persuade, if not compel,
domestic legal outcomes.130  Thus, examining sources of general interna-
tional law may be helpful in addressing rights in the African context.
The constitutions of several states, including Senegal, Namibia, and
Cameroon, explicitly refer to international law.131  These states’ docu-
ments indicate that their domestic laws are subject to binding international
law.132  Simultaneously, common law systems in Africa, as explained in
Part II of this Note, acknowledge that African customary law is part of the
law of the state so long as the customary law is not repugnant to the state’s
constitution.133  Thus, the state’s body of law accounts for both interna-
tional law and African customary law existing in the same legal framework.
This section of the Note will therefore discuss the ways in which interna-
tional law can reinforce customary land rights without changing the funda-
mental characteristics of African customary law.  The text will reveal that
even when constitutions do not expressly refer to international law, people
can look to regional institutions that recognize international law.134  These
regional institutions have successfully applied international human rights
law to the issue of land rights.  Accordingly, the remainder of this section
will analyze the potential for international human rights law to reinforce
the property rights under African customary law.
A. Existing Sources of International Law Support Land Rights for
Indigenous Peoples
International law recognizes the right of indigenous peoples over
lands and territories that they have traditionally occupied.  Scholars assert
that the principle of reallocation, in theory, should protect indigenous peo-
128. 65 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933) [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
129. Id.
130. Id.  Nsongurua Udombana suggests that the principle of pacta sunt servanda
eliminates the monism/dualism issues that arise when trying to implement interna-
tional law, particularly the African Charter in African states. See Nsongurua J.
Udombana, Between Promise and Performance: Revisiting States’ Obligations Under the
African Human Rights Charter, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 105, 126 (2004).  With reference to
international law made through treaties, the Vienna convention asserts that under pacta
sunt servanda, “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26,
May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
131. Udombana, supra note 130, at 125– 26.
132. Id. at 125 (citing CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (2014), § 199 ch. I, 12(1)).
133. Udombana, supra note 130, at 126. R
134. DAMROSH, HENKIN, MURPHY& SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 975
(5th ed. 2009).
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ple from encroachment on land for large-scale investment because the dec-
larations require “free and informed consent.”135  Free and informed
consent is the “right of indigenous peoples to make free and informed
choices about the development of their lands and resources.”136  The aim
of the provision is to “ensure that indigenous peoples are not coerced or
intimidated” and that their consent is sought and freely given “prior to the
authorization and start of any activities.”137  Practically, this requires the
state or investors, depending on the structure of the land transaction, to
give the people full information about the scope and impact of any pro-
posed developments.138  Fundamentally, this process would ensure that
the peoples’ “choice to give or withhold consent is respected.”139
Yet, this free and informed consent likely only affects international
legal obligations when recognized as a treaty, customary international law,
general principle, decision from an international tribunal, or part of inter-
national legal scholars’ work.140  As detailed below, the principle of free
and informed consent exists in treaty law.141  In some cases, however, the
relevant treaty may not directly apply to an African state if the state is not a
signatory to the treaty.142  For this reason, local populations will have a
stronger case for defending land rights if free and informed consent is also
considered international custom.  An international custom is defined as
state practice supported by opinio juris.143  Thus, a practice becomes inter-
national custom when exercised widely among states due to a sense of
legal obligation or reciprocity.  As the remainder of this section will illus-
trate, the requirement of “free and informed consent” appears in several
sources of international law, which strongly suggests that the requirement
has become an international custom.
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples reiterates support
for indigenous peoples’ free and informed consent.144  This United
Nations General Assembly resolution provides that states “should consult
and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples involved through
their own representative institutions in order to obtain free and informed
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their land or
135. Olivier de Shutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the Rights
of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 534 (2011).
136. Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples’
Participation Rights Within International Law, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 54 (2011).
137. Id.; U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub Comm. on Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights Working Group in Indigenous Populations, Working Paper: Standard-
Setting: Legal Commentary on the Concept of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent, P 57, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2005/WP.1, 2005 (July 14, 2005) (prepared by Antoanella-
Iulia Motoc and the Tebtebba Foundation) [hereinafter CHR Standard Setting].
138. CHR Standard Setting, supra note 137, at 47. R
139. Id.
140. See International Court of Justice, art. 38.
141. See infra Part IV at 25.
142. See Vienna Convention, supra note 130, art. 11– 12. R
143. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
§102(2) (1987); see also infra note 166. R
144. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Sept 13, 2007,
G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (2007), art. 32(2) [hereinafter UN DRIP].
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resources . . . particularly with regards to the utilization or exploitation of
mineral, water, or other resources.”145  The resolution likely comports with
African customary law’s framework because the Article 32(2) provision
indicates that states should cooperate through the indigenous people’s
“own representative institutions.”146  These institutions in customary law,
as discussed earlier, involve chiefs, groups of locals, and headmen that con-
sult the chiefs.  Article 28 of the resolution further suggests that the provi-
sions would apply to all rural lands operating under African customary
law.  Specifically, Article 28 defines the scope of the affected lands to those
“traditionally owned or otherwise operated.”147  Traditional ownership
extends the principle of free and informed consent to chiefs who have para-
mount title, while the text regarding “otherwise operated” land likely
applies to the land where individuals have usufruct rights.
International treaties also contribute to an international custom of
requiring free and informed consent from indigenous populations in land
transactions.  The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights (“ICESCR”), for example, requires state parties to the conven-
tion to “respect the principle of free, prior, and informed consent of the
affected peoples” concerning a people’s right to participate in cultural
life.148  The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
the supervisory body of the ICESCR, interpreted Article 15 of the covenant
to include the rights of indigenous peoples to restitution of lands, territo-
ries, and resources traditionally used and enjoyed by indigenous communi-
ties if taken without the prior, informed consent of the affected
peoples.”149
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) may also indicate an emerging custom for
recognizing indigenous populations’ right to property.  In fact, ICERD Arti-
cle 5 explicitly refers to indigenous people’s right to property.150  Relevant
for foreign investors in the mining industry, this ICERD right to property
includes the right to land and subsoil resources.151  The Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) further finds that interna-
tional law prohibits parties from making any decision relating directly to
indigenous people without their informed consent.152  When read
together, Article 5 and General Comment 21 interpret ICERD to require
potential investors to receive the locals’ separate informed consent for both
the land and resources such as coal or oil.  Thus, as in the Declaration of
Rights of Indigenous People, state parties must “ultimately ensure the con-
145. Id.; Ward, supra note 136, at 58. R
146. UN DRIP, supra note 144, art. 32(2).
147. Id. at art. 28.
148. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art 15, P1(a).
149. CESCR, General Comment No. 21 Right of everyone to take part in cultural life
(art, 15, P 1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights),
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009) P 36; Ward, supra note 136, at 58. R
150. ICERD, art. 5.
151. Id. art. 5(d)(v).
152. CESCR, General Comment No. 21.
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sent of the indigenous people with regard to the development and resource
exploitation within their traditional lands and territories.”153
Although these general comments and recommendations on the appli-
cation of U.N. treaties are not legally binding decisions, they indicate con-
sensus in the international community.  This consensus has influenced
persuasive regional decisions in African Regional courts.
In the landmark decision of Endorois v. Kenya, delivered on February
4, 2010, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirmed a
report by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights recogniz-
ing the indigenous peoples’ right to property.154  There, the court found
that the Endorois, a pastoralist community in central Kenya, had custom-
ary rights to land from which the Kenyan government had dispossessed
them in 1973.  To arrive at this conclusion, the court relied upon the Afri-
can Charter.155
The second portion of the African Charter specifically addresses the
right to property as a type of egalitarian or positive right that “enhances the
power of the government to do something for the person” while “displaying
a highly social orientation.”156  This right under the African Charter
accords with the Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
where the right to property “may only be encroached upon in the interest
of public need or in the general interest of the community.”157
The Endorois decision also looks to other sections of the Charter to
support the indigenous people’s right to land and subsoil resources.  Spe-
cifically, the court refers to the African Charter’s solidarity rights— rights
not vested in the individual, but in the collective groups of individuals
153. Ward, supra note 136, at 57. R
154. The African Commission interprets and applies the African Charter using
human rights standards that include decisions by U.N. treaty bodies. In doing so, the
African Commission may also consider principles of law exercised by states party to the
African Charter as well as African practices consistent with international human rights
norms. See generally African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3/CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59, art. 60-61 (1982) [hereinafter African
Charter]; see also Udombana, supra note 130, at 120. R
155. The goal of the African Charter was to “borrow from modernism only what does
not misrepresent our civilization and deep nature.”  Udombana, supra note 130, at 112 R
(citing President Leopold Sedar Senghor, Address at Meeting of Experts for the Prepara-
tion of the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Dakar, Senegal (Nov.
28, 1979), in REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EMERG-
ING AFRICAN SYSTEM 121, 124 (P. Kunig et al. eds., 1985)).
156. Nsongurua J. Udombana argues that the African Charter enshrines three tradi-
tional generations of human rights: civil and political rights (libertarian rights); eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights (egalitarian rights); and peoples’ or groups’ rights
(solidarity rights).  Udombana adopts Karel Vasak’s human rights typology where there
are three generations of human rights: liberty, equality, and solidarity. Udombana,
supra note 130, at 115 (citing Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Demo- R
cratic Governance in Africa, 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1209, 1224– 25 (2003)). See generally
Karel Vasak, A 30 year struggle; The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, UNESCO Courier, Nov. 1977, at 29; see also African Char-
ter, supra note 154, art. 14. R
157. African Charter, supra, note 154, art 14. R
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called “peoples.”158  One such right, articulated in Article 21, safeguards
the “right of peoples to dispose of natural wealth and resources in the inter-
est of the peoples.”159  The goal is to “promote[ ] international economic
cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable exchange, and the princi-
ples of international law.”160  In Endorois, the court considered the fertile
lands and lake “natural wealth and resources.”161  As the Kenyan govern-
ment’s decision to move the Endorois did not serve the Endorois interests,
the court found that the government had threatened the peoples’ Article 21
rights.162  In light of this and other provisions, the African Court of
Human and Peoples’ Rights held that the Endorois eviction from Lake
Bogoria violated the Endorois’s rights under the African Charter as an
indigenous people.163  Specifically, the eviction provided the Endorois
with only minimum compensation and violated their right to property
(Article 14); culture (Article 17(2) and (3)); religion (Article 8); natural
resources (Article 21); and development (Article 22).164  By consequence,
the court ordered the Kenyan Government to restore the Endorois to their
ancestral land and to compensate them.165
Regional and international practice regarding property rights for
indigenous populations extends beyond the domain of existing treaty obli-
gations for states.  Thus, the property rights appear to rise to the level of
international custom, where there is state practice and opinio juris.166
B. Locals Can Invoke International Custom to Protect African
Customary Law Land Rights
African customary law can couple with international customary law to
provide a stronger system of land rights and prevent land grabs.  As Section
A illustrates, international treaties, conventions, and a regional court deci-
sion support this proposition.  Excluding indigenous property regimes
from the property protected under the conventions would perpetuate the
long history of indigenous peoples’ forced dispossession, which contra-
158. Udombana, supra note 130, at 117. R
159. African Charter, supra note 154, art. 21(1). R
160. Id. art. 21(3).
161. 276/03: Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights
Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare council) v. Kenya, available at http://www.achpr.org/
files/sessions/46th/comunications/276.03/achpr46_276_03_eng.pdf [hereinafter
Endorois v. Kenya].
162. Id.  ¶¶ 265– 68.
163. Id. at Recommendation ¶ 1.
164. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982); Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 160, ¶¶  238,
251, 268, 298.
165. Endorois v. Kenya, supra note 160, at Recommendation ¶1.
166. S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’
Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System,
14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 53 (2001) (explaining that norms of customary law arise when
a preponderance of states and other authoritative actors converge upon a common
understanding of the norms’ content and generally expect future behavior in conformity
with the norms).
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venes the object and purpose of the convention.167  Some may argue, how-
ever, that several conceptual difficulties apply when adapting African
customary law to the principles of international custom.  This section finds
that African customary law can address these concerns.
1. Potential Impediments
One potential concern in applying customary international law and
treaties to the African context is defining an “indigenous population.”
With African populations’ migratory history, especially during nineteenth
century border changes and modern warfare, the “indigenous population”
is not well defined.168  Furthermore, even when an investor dispossesses a
particular ethnic group of its land, the group may not have been the origi-
nal occupants.  In that sense, the group is not truly “indigenous” to the
area.  African courts have already confronted this issue.  In Endorois, for
example, the African Court of Human Rights did not inquire as to whether
the Endorois pastoralist community originally occupied its land prior to
European colonization.  The court used the 1973 government reallocation
as a time marker for where to assert ownership.  When we look to the legal
structure governing rural African communities, African customary law ade-
quately accounts for the issue of defining the community.  As discussed in
Part II of this Note, the chief’s land allocations reflect community member-
ship.  Under African customary law, the chief thus determines the mem-
bers of the community when he or she allocates land to individuals for use.
A second concern is that domestic law may prevent international cus-
tom from applying to indigenous populations.  The magnitude of this
impediment depends on the individual state’s constitution.  Constitutions
in a dualist system do not generally consider treaties of international law
as self-executing.169  Consequentially, domestic legislative processes must
occur before the treaty can come into force.  For example, the text of those
constitutions similar to the 1999 constitution of Nigeria may provide that
“no treaty between the Federation and any other country should have the
force of law except to the extent that any such treaty has been enacted into
law by the National Assembly.”170
By contrast, other constitutions call for the direct implementation of
international law.  For example, the supremacy clause of the Kenyan consti-
167. Id. at 43.  Although this refers to rights in the American system, the property
rights afforded in the American Convention of Human Rights and the American Declara-
tion on the Rights and Duties of Man parallel the rights in the African Charter and
ICERD. Thus the authors’ discussion regarding the object and purpose of those treaties
is applicable to the present discussion.
168. See Boone, supra note 75, at 564-65 (discussing the difficulty of identifying R
indigents).
169. The terms “self-executing” and “non-self executing” are typically used in the
American context.  This Note employs the typology to streamline understanding of the
different African systems.
170. Udombana, supra note 130, 126 (citing CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999) ch. I, R
12(1), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNi
geria.htm).
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tution mandates the following: “[G]eneral rules of international law shall
form part of the law of Kenya.”171  Further, Part 6 of the clause continues,
“any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of
Kenya under th[e] Constitution.”172  The analysis above reveals that the
free and informed consent of indigenous people with regard to property
sales is likely both a treaty obligation and international custom.  Conse-
quentially, the principle would apply in a state like Kenya, where the state
party to the treaty automatically adopts general rules of international law
or international custom.
2. Guiding Principle as Overall Solution
States may nevertheless avoid this inquiry altogether under the jus
cogens norm of pacta sunt servanda.  The Vienna Convention asserts that
under pacta sunt servanda, “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the par-
ties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”173  Consequen-
tially, states must adhere to the provisions— or at least refrain from
contravening the treaty’s object and purpose— regardless of the domestic
process.  Below, this Note will explore how this principle, when coupled
with the principle of free and informed consent, could greatly affect the
process underlying large-scale land transactions so that such transactions
are no longer land grabs.
C. A New Land Deal
As explained in Part II, the way in which private and institutional
investors use land acquired in large-scale land deals is alien to African cus-
tomary law.  Thus, if large-scale land deals are to take place, African states
need to create (1) a mechanism for obtaining and determining community
involvement that reflects the principle of free and informed consent, and
(2) a mechanism for land sales.
Part IV, Section A illustrates that the principle of free and informed
consent can apply to African states, placing obligations on both foreign
investors and government agencies that facilitate the land deals.  Here,
investors would work with chiefs and local headman who would typically
control the land transactions under African customary law.174  Working
through chiefs and headmen likely increases the possibility for the indige-
nous people to take part in decision-making— as compared to land deals
that entirely circumvent local actors.  Even so, the people’s participation is
not guaranteed because chiefs do not have a pure agency relationship with
the indigenous people that they govern.  In a pure agency relationship, a
fiduciary responsibility arises when a principal manifests assent in an
agent that the agent shall act on behalf of the principle and subject to the
171. CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2(5) (2010).
172. Id. at 2(6).
173. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 115
U.N.T.S. 31.
174. See supra Part II; see also supra Part IV(A).
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principal’s control.175  Unlike elected officials, chiefs generally do not con-
sult voting schemes and polls to arrive at decisions.176  Chiefs instead
receive advice from local headmen or other influential members of the
community.177  In that regard, chiefs are not purely agents.  Despite acting
on the people’s behalf, chiefs are not truly subject to the people’s control.
Chiefs thus have more autonomy than elected representatives or other
“agents of the state.”178  Given this power imbalance, the resulting issue
then involves extending consent to the local people who are apart from
indigenous leadership.  A potential solution must therefore ensure that
individual community members can consent to the large-scale land deals
so that they may, albeit within limits, act on their own behalf, subject to
their own control to counteract any self-dealing by the chiefs and headmen.
1. Mechanism for Community Involvement
This standard of free and informed consent could serve as the basis
for a mechanism to obtain community agreement.  Given the community-
based nature of customary law societies in Africa, this process for
obtaining agreement would likely involve informal gatherings with clans
and kinship groups potentially implicated by the land sale.  Though a
strong policy, this consultation would likely have to include precise steps
in order to avoid the pitfalls of other consultations in the African context.
For example, land acquisition consultations in Mozambique were not effec-
tive because the communities did not receive relevant information prior to
the consultation meetings.179  Further, the meetings primarily consisted of
male community leaders rather than ordinary members.180  This lack of
adequate representation exacerbated the fact that the consultations were
typically performed in one meeting without compete records.181  For these
reasons, a mechanism for obtaining the people’s free and informed consent
would require several meetings to occur at different points in the negotia-
tion process; where chiefs would attend the consultation along with a pro-
portionate representation of interested parties (that includes women and
other land users); where a third party would transcribe the record; and
where the investor (or representative) would present each interested party
with a detailed presentation of material aspects of the project and the par-
ties could provide their comments in an open forum.  In accord with Afri-
can customary law, this consultation would involve community leaders.
Yet to adhere to the principle of free and informed consent, the process
would allow for free information sharing and meaningful comment from
the indigenous peoples.  To respect investor aims, the consultations would
not disclose commercial information.  Further, the information for inter-
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006).
176. See, e.g. BARBARA A. BARDES, PUBLIC OPINION: MEASURING THE AMERICAN MIND Part
II (2012).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Cotula, supra note 118, at 72. R
180. Id.
181. Id.
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ested parties and local stakeholders would not in effect include more than
the investors would have already provided in their internal due diligence.
Thus, these measured consultations may reinforce the legal framework to
prevent land grabs.
2. Mechanism for Large-Scale Sales
In terms of new mechanisms for land transactions, some scholars have
contemplated institutional measures that implicate more than the negotia-
tion process.182  Such instruments include shareholder and tax require-
ments.  In Sierra Leone for instance, the policy instituted in 2009 requires
that Sierra Leonean hold 5% to 20% of shares in biofuel investment.183  In
theory, this plan could prove effective given that the managers and direc-
tors at the center of the investment would then owe fiduciary duties to
those in-country shareholders.184  The problem, however, is that this seems
to protect local people after the initial investment has occurred.  In that
sense, the shareholder requirement may not adequately address the inequi-
table transfer of land that occurs during the course of the large-scale land
deals.  Sierra Leone couples this requirement with out-grower schemes in
agricultural investment.185  This policy has not yet been successful given
the fact that investors prefer to create more robust business models and run
the projects themselves.186
An alternative solution could involve instituting a tax on developers to
discourage speculative ventures or providing a tax haven for investors that
promote economic development.  Imposing these measures would increase
the likelihood that the land sales that occur reflect terms to which the peo-
ple would freely consent.
Taxes may introduce an avenue for regulation given that the official
land fees seem to play a relatively unimportant role in government land
allocations— particularly in rural areas.187  Here, the government either
fails to charge the fee or charges a merely nominal rate.188  For instance, in
the Northern State in Sudan, the rent for 1.03 acres of land may cost about
$2 or $3 USD.189  Possible reasons for the nominal fee include the low land
rents and the fact that the government perceives the expected benefits of
the deal to exceed the opportunity costs.190  In the Daewoo-Madagascar
land deal, for example, the government did not even require rent on
account of the focus on job creation and infrastructure development.191
Thus when governments enter land deals with a focus on infrastructure
182. See generally Cotula, supra note 118. R
183. Id. at 84.
184. See BARDES, supra note 176, at Part III. R
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Cotula, supra note 118, at 78. R
188. Id.
189. Id. at 79 (comparing rent of 1 fedan of land in the rural area to the rent of about
$15 to $20 USD for 1 fedan in the city of Khartoum).
190. Id. at 78.
191. Id. at 79.
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benefits, they often disregard initial land fees to investors.  Although it may
be plausible for there to exist higher prices in private-private transactions,
where information is typically not disclosed, the generally low prices indi-
cate that imposing a tax on speculative ventures may not be an undue
burden.
Some may argue however, that such taxes would discourage all invest-
ment— not just investment from the financial sector.  True, one motivation
for large-scale land investment in Africa is the favorable tax and fiscal
incentives.192  In fact, the Sudanese government exempts agricultural con-
cessions from custom duties, tax on all capital items, and income and
profit tax in hopes of building agriculture as a strategic sector.193  Conse-
quently, tailoring tax to benefit investors that support local economic
development could result in a win-win situation.  Here, sovereign investors
and agribusiness could profit from relatively inexpensive investment and
potentially high long-term returns, while the local population could benefit
from the capital inflow and potentially mitigate their own food security
concerns.
Although these tax measures do not directly implicate the principle of
free and informed consent, the principle— as incorporated in African cus-
tomary law and the common law— can bolster the tax measures.  This is
particularly true in the initial segment of the typical large-scale land deal,
where the government agency interacts with the investor.  Importantly, the
principle of free and informed consent may in turn obligate the govern-
ment to ensure that the decision to impose the tax on a particular investor
still allows for the indigenous people to give or withhold consent to the
sale.
Conclusion
As this Note has illustrated, land grabs take place behind a complex
legal framework where the rights of the local populations are uncertain.
Media reports and legal scholarship suggest that a laissez-faire perspective
will not suffice to rectify the issue.194  Thus, international law must protect
against these land grabs by enforcing real property rights.  The idea is that
property is “not a primary quality of assets, but the legal expression of an
economically meaningful consensus about assets.”195  When rights con-
flict between African customary law’s communal regime and the common
law’s user-rights regime that foreign investors expect, there is little consen-
sus.  Typically, investor expectations dominate at the expense of the local
population.196  The challenge for African countries is to integrate these
legal conventions in a way that benefits all parties involved.
192. Making Investment Work, supra note 4, at 7. R
193. Cotula, supra note 118, at 80. R
194. See supra Introduction, Part II.
195. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 157 (2000).
196. See supra Part III.
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In examining sources of law at various levels, this Note revealed that
the power of chiefs to allocate land varies vis-a`-vis foreign investors,
depending on whether the African country’s government operates under
the communal regime or user-rights regime.  This variation exposes the gap
in the bifurcated legal system.  Recognizing the devastating evictions and
lack of development that local communities face in the wake of land grabs,
this Note then explored the potential for international law to reinforce cus-
tomary law and remedy the issue.  The key source of international law is
the emerging custom of “free and informed consent” for indigenous people.
The analysis illustrated that it takes more than speaking with the
chiefs to garner the “free, prior and informed consent of the affected peo-
ples.”197  Given the complexity of the bifurcated legal system and high
potential for domestic self-dealing, the local population must have a mean-
ingful opportunity to comment on the project before it is implemented.
Such opportunity must also adequately account for the nature of African
customary law, while complying with international standards for the rights
of indigenous populations.  International law thus imposes obligations on
the state, and by extension the investor, to garner the indigenous people’s
free and informed consent.  In practice, a mechanism for this consent
would require several meetings to occur at different points in the negotia-
tion process; where chiefs would attend the consultation along with a pro-
portionate representation of interested parties (including women and other
land users); where a third party would transcribe the record; and where the
investor (or representative) would present each interested party with a
detailed presentation of material aspects of the project and the parties
would provide their comments in an open forum.  In adhering to the prin-
ciple of free and informed consent, the process would allow for free infor-
mation sharing and meaningful comment from the indigenous peoples.  To
respect the diverse aims of states, agribusiness, and private equity fund
investors, the consultations would also not disclose commercial
information.
This conceptualization can change the way in which parties enter the
new wave of large-scale land deals in Africa.  Instead of a process that sets
African customary law aside from the state-made law, land deals can occur
through an integrated framework where international law strengthens Afri-
can customary law.  The aim is that this will transform land grabs to devel-
opment opportunities where African customary law can provide real
property rights rather than a mirage.
197. See supra Part IV.
